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In the summer, I watch hummingbirds fly and hover near a feeder that my wife,
Dot,  carefully  fills  with nectar and  hangs  in view of the  kitchen  window  of our
country home in rural Georgia.  The store-bought nectar is colored red, since people
think that hummingbirds find that color attractive.  Business around the feeder picks
up following rains that wash away the birds'  naturally-provided food.  It is then that
the feeder becomes  crowded and a hummingbird struggle  ensues.  Almost always,
there is at least one bird that attempts to control access to the feeder-what naturalists
sometimes call a dominant male.
The dominant male, seeking to maintain control, will fly rapidly to the feeder,
place  its beak into the  small opening  for a  quick draft of nectar,  and then fly to a
nearby perch where it vigilantly  monitors the feeder.  When other birds attempt to
feed, the monitor quickly tries to intercept and  force them away from the stock of
sweet food.  But, while the monitor engages in dogfights with one bird, another often
swoops in and takes its fill.
Hummingbirds have no way to stake a claim to the feeder.  So far as we can tell,
hummingbird  communities  have  no  constitution  that reflects  evolved rules  for
establishing  a social order.  Most likely, a long process of adaptation and selection
has  generated hummingbirds  capable of living  in a world  where nourishment is a
common-access  resource-a  commons.  Hummingbirds  cannot  store  nectar for
tomorrow;  even  their homes  are  constantly  besieged.  They  live  a  life  of flight,
engaging in a constant search for nourishment to feed their high-energy lives and, at
times, fighting for temporary control of valuable resources.
People are like hummingbirds in their attempts to use environmental resources.
But unlike hummingbirds,  people  have  built institutions that  take the  edge off a
frantic commons struggle.  People have found ways to improve land, invest in herds
and crops, harvest, store, transfer to others, keep some and pass some along to their
heirs.  People  invented  property rights and the  obligations  that go with them.  If
*This discussion is taken from Bruce Yandle,  Common Sense and Common Law for the
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dumb things, they pay damages.  Private property rights are the most powerful social
invention ever to develop in man's pageant on this earth.  The environmental tensions
that affect agriculture and other natural resource activities begin and end with struggles
over the  definition  and enforcement  of property  rights.  My  comments  focus  on
crucial  elements of the  struggle.  Starting with  an explanation of private  property
rights,  how they  evolved  and how  they worked to  secure environmental  assets,  I
then describe the decline  of those rights, the rule of law  and the rise of the rule of
politics.  Along the way, we will observe a tendency for hummingbird economies to
surface in our world, and then will note  a growing trend that suggests a return to a
world  where  private  property  rights  again  provide  environmental  security  and  a
basis for the creation of new wealth.
Property Rights and Common  Law
Private  property  rights  did  not evolve  easily  and  are  not well  understood.
Indeed,  some  are so misinformed  as to believe that private  property rights  are the
villain in the  environmental  saga;  that politics  and  command-and-control  are the
solution.  It is little wonder. Most people today have matured in a world governed by
the rule of politics.  Few can recall the time when the rule of law governed the use of
property.  Because of this, private property is  constantly threatened.  But even for
people, all environmental problems, indeed all problems of resource use, begin with
a  commons and  end with institutions-evolving  environmental  laws-that define
and protect environmental rights.
Until around 1970, environmental rights were well established in this country
by a system of common law, state statutes and local ordinances.  No, environmental
protection  did not begin  with the U.S.  Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA).
Environmental law had been evolving for centuries.  Until 1970, common-law rights
protected citizens from unwanted air and water pollution, provided havens on public
land  for endangered  species,  and  provided  protection  for wetlands  and sensitive
habitat through systems of purchased easements.  Multi-state and regional compacts
provided  the  means  for  managing  entire  river  basins.  The  emphasis  was  on
outcomes-not  inputs, rules, technologies  and permits.
Things operated differently in the pre-EPA days.  If a large number of people
were  threatened  by pollution,  they  could  and  did  bring public  nuisance  actions
against the polluter.  Private nuisance  actions were brought by individual occupiers
of land who were harmed or threatened by pollution.  The law, which was tailored to
fit the controversy at hand, was  tough.  The remedies  included injunction,  which
means operators were shut down, and/or damages to be paid to the aggrieved parties.
The system, which was  based on private  property rights,  was not perfect.  But if
someone wanted to  alter land use, the process was rather  simple.  You found  the
landowner, negotiated  with him or her  and, if successful,  purchased  the  rights to
manage the land in your own way.
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the hummingbird feeders, a few bluebird boxes stand on the land that Dot and I own
in rural Georgia.  Cultivated plants, commonly called "butterfly shrubs," attract fragile
insects  to the porches of the old house where we spend our summers.  These  small
but important assets are located on our property.  The place has been in our family for
almost 100 years; it is not for sale.
Our right to have bluebird boxes  enjoys the  security of law common to the
people  in our community;  this provides a zone of autonomy that defines part of the
essence of our  life.  The  law common  to the people  is the  same kind  of law that
Justinian's scribes recorded for the Roman Empire in 534.  Environmental law is not
new.  The law  common to the people  is  law  discovered by community judges;  it
reflects common sense and rules of just conduct.  Among the rights common to the
people of Jones County we enjoy is  the right not to be disturbed or harmed.  Our
neighbors enjoy similar rights.  They have the right not to be bothered by us.  These
rights define zones of freedom and autonomy that allow for self-discovery, creativity
and the generation of new thoughts  and products.
Rules of common law limit these zones of freedom.  If in exercising my freedom
to cultivate land, runoff from my land pollutes the drinking water of my neighbor's
cattle, my neighbor has a potential cause of action against me.  If my neighbor's use
of herbicides damages my apple trees, I have a potential cause of action against him.
Our free zones are defined by environmental rights.  The common-law rights that we
enjoy are ancient.  They are based on rules that emerged from natural law, which is
another way of saying that the law of the land we unconsciously rely on has existed
since "time out of mind."
If anyone  damages  our property  or threatens us for having butterfly  shrubs
and bird feeders, we can call the sheriff and gain protection.  We have never had to
do that.  Our neighbors watch our place, and we theirs.  The rights we enjoy are really
enforced by our small community, which is unincorporated.  Extended lines of  kinship
and long-standing  patterns  of land  ownership  are dominant  characteristics  of the
area.  We have no  local  government.  But, the  laws we  follow and  maintain are
sanctioned by the sheriff-who  carries a  gun.  The property rights we hold in the
community of Round  Oak, which is  located in Jones County, Georgia, provide  us
with a private  sphere  of action,  a zone  that cannot be invaded by  ordinary people
without our permission or the permission of our neighbors.
Not too far from  our place,  a neighbor  plants, cultivates  and harvests  trees.
Our neighbor unconsciously  relies  on the security of property rights when making
15-year  plans for improving  the soil, selecting seedlings, planting and harvesting.
When harvested,  the trees  make their way to a Georgia-Pacific  mill that produces
merchant lumber and plywood.  Chips from the process are carried by train to a paper
mill that converts the chips to energy and paper.  The paper mill, located on private
property in the next county, discharges waste into the Ocmulgee River.
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the mill.  He and other employees continually monitored the chemistry of the mill's
discharge  and the receiving  waters  of the  Ocmulgee  River.  There were  no water
quality statutes that required this.  Owners of land downstream from the mill held the
common law right not to have deteriorated water pass their land.  If those rights were
violated, common law judges could shut down the mill.  No government permit gave
the right  to pollute  a river.  In the  1950s, private  property  rights were  dominant.
Indeed, they were so dominant that some special interest groups began to agitate for
federal legislation to secure a stronger voice in determining water quality rules.  The
easier law of politics began to displace the tougher law of the people.
The railroad that carries  the  chips is  located  on private property.  The  train
travels on tracks that are just across the state highway from our place.  The highway
and its right-of-way are public property.  Each year, highway workers come and trim
some of  my crepe myrtle trees because they infringe on the right-of-way.  The highway
department  never  asks  my permission.  It  is  serving  a  larger public  interest  that
competes  with my private  interest.  We  ordinary  folk understand  this,  and do not
object. We enjoy reciprocal gains.  But, the highway department can also only go so
far, and it understands this.  The zone of public authority is limited.
The railroad was built 120 years ago.  The railroad company holds a deed to the
right-of-way that has been contested infrequently.  My neighbor-the tree farmer-
the paper mill, the railroad company, and I enjoy private spheres of action that cannot
be  invaded  by  other private  parties  without  our permission.  But, we  have little
reason ever to think about all this.  These  rules of law are common to the people.
They are a vital part of an informal order.
By informal  order, I refer  to an evolved social  order based on rules  of just
conduct and common sense that are fundamental  to a free society.  Participants in the
informal  order follow unwritten rules, often doing so unconsciously.  The informal
order serves a vital purpose.  Otherwise, it would cease to exist.  It is economic in the
deepest sense of the word.  But, its existence can be eclipsed and, indeed, erased by
formal actions  that rely on statutes, regulations  and politics.
The informal order that sanctions property rules and leaves an unspecified but
constrained zone of freedom  is based on the unanimous consent of rightholders; it is
described as relying on a rule of law.  The formal order, which depends on statutes
and  regulations  and  frequently  defines  positive rights  and  corresponding  duties,
relies on a rule ofmajoritarian politics.  The ground is obviously set for conflict when
the two order-generating  systems collide.  That is where we are in 1997.
Trees, butterflies, blue birds, paper mills, railroad track and land are real things;
things that form part of our accumulated wealth.  But, the property rights that surround
these things  are pure abstractions;  social inventions  that distinguish  communities
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boundaries that define and protect families, homes, schools, businesses and industrial
facilities.  Whether defined by the state or merely sanctioned by it, property rights
form the basis for all trade and commerce.  Indeed, the things we call property are
valuable because of the underlying rights that connect the things to specific human
beings.
Dot and I speak of our country home.  My neighbor talks about his trees.  The
railroad company speaks of its right-of-way.  The  sanctity of our rights encourages
conservation and long-term planning.  Dot and I take pains to maintain our home; we
enjoy the place, but we also expect to pass the property rights to our children.  The
right to exclude and to transfer to others encourages us to maintain assets that might
otherwise erode away.  Property rights of some type or form provide the foundation
of all social life as we know it.
The  Roots  of the  Law
This  brief description  of life  in Jones  County,  Georgia,  could  be  repeated
countless times for just as many other places in the United States.  Bundles of private
property rights that evolved from  custom, tradition and country courthouses  form
the bedrock of community life and make up a system of private law that, more often
than not, silently supports the common transactions  of day-to-day life in America.
Resorting to litigation is the exception, not the rule.  When considered relative to the
number of transactions that occur in the course of a normal day, suits over property
rights are indeed a minuscule part of private  life.  This system of law and property
rights pre-existed the nation and  the Constitution.  The  surrounding common  law
can be traced directly to England and a time when there was no national government.
Indeed, the concept of  nations did not exist at the time of its origin. But, legal scholars
can trace what they term "law  common to the people"  to the dawn of history.  The
origin of private property rights is simply unknown.  In that sense, private property
rights  per  se are  not the  inventions  of governments,  parliaments,  presidents  and
kings.  They are a social phenomenon, part of a Darwinian process that has everything
to do with people, survival and the accumulation of resources.  But, they can be and
are recognized,  sanctioned and formalized by government.  Still, we should  never
confuse  law and the theory of society with politics and government.
While  rights  common  to  the people  did  not emerge  from  governments,
governments  have much to do with them.  Governments  were invented to provide
more security to rights than might be obtained otherwise and to transfer wealth from
one  group to  another.  When  governments  were  invented,  shaped  and  reformed,
some  founders  took  pains  to  restrict  government  actions  that might disturb  the
sanctity of their private rights. They were  fearful of government's  redistributional
tendencies.  The rights protectors attempted to reinforce  the process that supported
the private property customs, traditions and rules.  At the same time, others saw the
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to their public property preferences.  The issue  is control, and the goal is to control
and not pay.
Following  an  ancient struggle  on the matter,  we find  in the  Magna  Charta
(1215)  these words supportive of the private meme:  No freeman shall be deprived  of
his free tenement or liberties  or  fee custom but by lawful  judgment of his peers and
by the law of the land.  I note that the term law of the land was used at the time to
define common law. Four hundred years later, after struggling with a despotic ruler,
the people  of England wrote  their Petition of Rights  through Parliament in  1635,
which  says:  Englishmen are free  in their property, which cannot be taken by
government. It is not surprising that the free Englishmen who formed this nation and
penned our  Constitution wrote  what  we call  the takings  clause:  Nor shall private
property be  taken for public use without just compensation.  There  was really
nothing novel about the statement, which some of the founders thought to be self-
evident and redundant.  Law common to the people had been operating in the older
colonies  for more  than a  century when the Constitution was adopted.  But, those
supporting  the  law of land wanted more  assurance  that the  rule of law would be
preserved explicitly  in the  Constitution.  By having the  statement included  in the
Constitution, the chances  for survival were  enhanced.
Takings  clause  requirements  are  extended  to  the  states  by  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  which  says  that  "any State [shall not] deprive any person of...
property, without due process of law. "  Indeed, protection  of private property from
state-government  takings  is buttressed by state constitutions,  forty-eight of which
contain takings clauses similar to that found in the federal constitution.  In addition,
twenty-four state constitutions  extend protection to property that is "damaged"  by
government action, even if it is not "taken."
Repeating  these  significant  social  statements  does not  make  obvious the
notion that private property rights are a settled issue.  Far from it. If that were so, the
statements would not be there.  The controversies  that continue to surround the idea
of private  property rights suggest that the notion  is certainly not all that obvious.
The  Decline  of Common  Law  Protection
Wetlands,  endangered  species protection  and statute-based  shields that deny
common law rights provide fruitful examples for exploring tensions between informal
and formal  ordering  systems.  With endangered  species, Congress, by statute, has
empowered regulators to engage in activities that can and do interfere with traditional
common-law rights.  In the case of wetlands, regulatory agencies, acting as agents of
Congress but without explicit statutory authority, have defined activities that allow
for the attenuation of private rights.  In addition, the Clean Water Act and a host of
state legislation have taken environmental rights previously held by ordinary people.
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against polluters in Wisconsin who damaged Chicago's drinking water.  They could
expect to, and did, receive  redress.  Those environmental rights were taken by the
1972 Clean Water Act.  Today, matters involving interstate pollution are in the hands
of federal  regulators.  If Milwaukee  meets  EPA mandates  but still  deteriorates
Chicago's  drinking water, Chicago has no redress.
At common law, owners of adjacent land could and did bring suit against hog
farmers if odors  and other unpleasantness  reduced the  value of land or  interfered
with the enjoyment of property.  Today, rightholders in 35 states cannot readily bring
action against neighbors who operate confined animal feeding operations that inflict
uninvited environmental costs on them.  The polluters are shielded by statute.  Private
property rights have been converted to public rights and transferred to administrative
agencies.  A government permit is all that is needed;  operators  of confined animal
feeding operations no longer worry about common law suits.  They have  a new and
perhaps more costly worry-making the political process work in their favor.
This conversion of private to public rights expanded significantly in the 1970s
and 1980s.  Consider my country home in Georgia.  If the American bluebird becomes
listed as endangered, a conversion of rights occurs immediately.  Agents of the U.S.
government can dictate what we can do on our land in Georgia.  Bluebird boxes will
disappear overnight.  If wetlands  are found  on my  neighbor's  land,  then  federal
authorities  can mandate  how and where  my neighbor  will plant and harvest trees.
Taking an expedient view, the logic of these mandates rests on the notion that politics
should  override  the  law of the  land  when important  social benefits  are  at  stake.
Staying with expediency,  others see the  same actions as an unfair infringement of
their property  rights.  If previously  held rights  are  to  be transferred,  then  the
prospective owner should be willing to pay for the rights received.  Otherwise, the
transfer will not be valid in a common law sense.
As a result, people in my region are wary about providing habitat for the red-
cockaded woodpecker,  since they will  lose the use of a  large  swath of land  if the
woodpecker is discovered.  Indeed, one well-known conservationist,  Ben Cone, of
North Carolina learned this the hard way (Welch, pp. 151-197).  Just as in the Pacific
Northwest, timber operators revise their harvest plans and, in some cases, clear cut
to avoid encounters with wetland regulators and endangered species.  Species habitat
is  lost. Affected  land values  fall  and previously  profitable ventures  become loss
leaders.
Regulatory  U-Turns  and Property Rights  Shifts
The U-Turn.  The huge increase in environmental rules that dramatically affect
the status of rights that were  once private contributes  significantly to a vibrant and
highly vocal national property rights movement that is successfully obtaining relief
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ordinary people who say "Enough is enough."  But the two major topics which seem
most  inflammatory  to  farmers  and ranchers,  endangered  species  protection  and
wetlands,  were  not  always  controversial  topics.  The  controversy  arose  when
politicians substituted the rule of politics for the rule of law. That is, when the status
of private lands rights  shifted to become public property.
The Endangered  Species  Enforcement  Shift.  Federal  statutes  protecting
endangered species have been on the books for almost 30 years, but few people were
bothered by the law until recently.  The reason for that is quite simple.  The language
of the first Endangered Species Act of 1966 and later versions of the law emphasized
government purchase  of sensitive lands, which were  then set aside  as a habitat for
the targeted species.  When government wanted private land for a public purpose, it
paid the owner.  Takings was the default position.
About  1985,  a  new  property  rights regime  emerged.  Enforcement  of the
Endangered  Species  Act took  a U-turn.  In  addition to acquiring  land through the
market, the federal government  began to use  its regulatory powers  to acquire land
rights. A system of feudal land-use rights, public property, replaced private property
rights.  Under the new regime, government assumed the position of superior owner
and dictated a system of actions to be followed by the citizen-tenant.  The bundle of
private property rights held previously by landowners was  sharply reduced.
But  before  the  U-turn,  and  even  after,  the purchase  of habitats  for  the
preservation  of native  endangered  species  drew  on  the  1964  Land  and  Water
Conservation Fund Act (LWCFA),  which created the Land and Water Conservation
Fund  (LWCF).  This fund  was established  "for the acquisition  of land,  waters, or
interests in land or waters .... for any national area which may be authorized  for the
preservation of species of fish and wildlife that are threatened with extinction (Land
and Water Conservation Fund of 1964)."
The Act appropriated $15 million from the Land and Water Conservation Fund
for such purchases.  The "taking"  of listed  species was prohibited only on federal
lands that were  designated  as wildlife refuges  (Endangered Species Preservation
Act of 1966).  Since establishment of  the LWCF in 1964, some $3.6 billion have been
used to purchase sensitive  land, and another $3.2 billion was allocated as matching
funds for states to purchase land (National Research Council).  Currently, the Fish
and Wildlife Service maintains 89 million acres in its 472 wildlife refuges.  But, the
purchase of land was controversial to ranchers and farmers in the West and those in
the Sage Brush Rebellion who saw even more private land falling into government
hands.
As the environmental movement shifted into high gear during the  1960s and
1970s, federal land management  agencies steadily increased their land base.  When
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purchased it.  From 1965  to 1979, total purchases increased from an average of 729
acres per year to 258,270 acres per year (National Research Council). By the mid- 1970s,
the wildlife refuge  system had grown to more than  30 million acres.  The  system
continued to grow in the late  1970s under President Carter, who  added  12 million
acres by Executive Order in 1978.  In  1980, the Alaska National  Interest Lands Act
designated another 42.9 million acres of Alaskan territory as refuge lands.  By 1980,
the Fish and Wildlife Service's land base stood at 87 million acres (Shanks).
The potential  for property rights takings emerged in 1980 when Congress  cut
appropriations to the Land and Water Conservation Fund.  Land purchases fell to an
annual average of 145,000 acres, down by almost 100,000 acres from the 1979 level
(National Research Council).  The Reagan administration brought a change in policy,
largely  as a result of Western concerns  about the  continuous  expansion of public
land ownership,  and began to sell public land.  A moratorium was placed on Land
and Water  Conservation Fund appropriations.
The government purchase of private land rights came to a halt, but the political
mandate  to provide  habitat  for  endangered  species  continued  apace.  No  longer
constrained by budgets, the land control agencies found it easier to designate more
land  as serving the public purpose.  Expansion of public ownership  was replaced
with expansion of takings.
The Wetlands U-Turn. What about wetlands?  Examination of  the story reveals
another U-turn  in property  rights  definition.  In  1990,  Congress  established  the
Wetlands Reserve Program.  The 1990 legislation stipulated that one million acres of
wetlands  be enrolled  over  a  five-year  period, beginning  in  1991,  by  purchasing
easements and property rights.  No appropriations  were made in 1991 but, in 1992,
$46 million was allocated for the purchase of private land rights.  Some 2,730 farmers
expressed interest in selling easements on 466,000 acres (Dunlap; National Research
Council).  The program was not controversial.  It was based on common sense and
common law.  You do not reap where you have not sown.  There were no takings.
Unfortunately for owners of private land, the Wetlands Reserve Program died
because of its great success.  Far more farmers submitted offers to sell than appropriated
funds would  support.  Funding  ended, but the urge to set aside  wetlands  did not,
especially  when the price was  zero.  Eventually, President Bush made  his famous
pronouncement, "No net loss of wetlands," and the bureaucratic transmission shifted
to high gear.  Without funds to pay due compensation, private property rights were
taken to serve the public interest.
With the  regulatory process  in high  gear, and  without  the need  to pay real
money  for property rights,  the  definition of wetlands  expanded  (Laffer).  At one
point, the  definition  included land that was  dry 358 of 365 days  in a year.  Then,
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into the waters of the United Stated began to be expanded.  In 1975,  a federal district
court  ordered  the  Clean Water Act  to be  applied  to wetlands  (Natural  Resources
Defense Council Ev Callaway).  After  that,  the  commerce  clause  was  invoked to
include any waters involved in interstate commerce, which was then determined to
be any water visited by migratory water fowl in their multi-state travels.
All  along,  Congress  never passed  a  wetlands  protection  act.  The  entire
regulatory  struggle was based on interpretations  of the Clean Water Act.  Although
Congress has not as yet amended the basic water pollution legislation to deal directly
with wetlands,  Congress had indeed dealt with  the topic.  That was when the U.S.
Department  of Agriculture  was  authorized  to negotiate  with  landowners  and pay
them to keep their land in its natural conditions-the Wetlands  Reserve Program.
Now, let me tell you about the U-turn.  Today, a permitting program run by the
U.S. Corps of Engineers involves  100 to 200 million acres of land and the processing
of 95,000 permits annually.  Under authority never officially delegated by Congress,
but certainly with its knowledge, regulatory agents have now pressed criminal charges
against farmers,  ranchers  and homebuilders for wetlands  violations.  Between the
years  1983 and  1993, the U.S. Justice Department indicted 751 individuals and 329
corporations for criminal violations.  Some 804  cases have resulted in convictions
and more than 400 years ofjail time have been collectively imposed.
In the earlier days of the Endangered Species  Act and the wetlands program,
there were two ways for interest groups to gain control of land.  One was market-based,
and based on a rule of law; the other was based on political  control.  With taxpayer
funds taken  from  the public  purse, the  regulatory agencies  could  acquire  private
property and serve a public purpose.  But when the funds dried up,  and the legislative
mandate  continued, the agencies marched forward, relying on government's  ability
to use its police powers  to serve the public interest.
Until now, the regulatory  U-turn,  which represents  a major shift in property
rights protection, has been passively accepted by the U.S.  Congress and celebrated
by environmental  groups that believe their interests are superior to those of private
land owners.  But, there  are signs  that private  property  rights  protection  will  re-
emerge, with farmers and ranchers leading the effort.
The  Property Rights  Response
Interest  group politics  suggests that no coalition  can  hold sway  forever.  At
some point, the costs imposed on those who bear the politically-determined  burden
become  unbearable.  In terms of the  Fifth Amendment,  a stretched  constitutional
constraint has only so much give to it.  Eventually, the takings clause must either be
disregarded totally and forgotten, or it must be reasserted.  The veritable  explosion
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rights  to land  eventually encompassed  a  huge number of people  who  recognized
their common problem.  The cost being borne by members of the group reached a
point where rational behavior called for a response.
Concern over property rights protection led to failed efforts in the early 1990s
to gain federal legislation.  Later, the 104th Congress added property rights protection
to the Contract with America.  No final action was taken.  Disappointed by the failed
effort to gain federal legislative protection, property rights advocates  moved to the
states.  In  September  1997,  some  form  of property  rights  legislation  and  related
governor's  executive orders were in place in 25  states.  Three of these have  statutes
that set trigger points  for compensation when government  regulations  reduce land
values.  Two provide for compensation without trigger points.  The others are of the
"look  before  you  leap"  variety,  putting  government  agencies  on  notice  that
burdensome  regulation can be costly.
Accompanying the property rights movement, we find major features of federal
regulatory authority devolving to the states.  The  reasons are threefold:
*  The  federal  government  cannot  afford  to enforce  the  many  statutes  and
regulations  now on the books.
*  Ordinary  people  have raised  a ruckus  about discriminatory  and,  in some
cases,  outrageous  enforcement.
*  After more than 20 years, the federal advantage in protecting environmental
quality is far from persuasive.  We have borne high costs, but we have not
received  high benefits.  We  also  find  common  sense  approaches  being
applied  in  river basin  management  that have  brought  nutrient-trading
schemes for point and nonpoint  sources  of phosphorous  and nitrogen.
But while these changes offer reasons to be optimistic about better prospects
for the environment and productive life as we have known it, there are counter forces
to consider.  New air pollution standards are now in place that will augment those still
not met by a vast number of locations.  Pending treaties to control carbon emissions
could impose  extraordinary  costs on energy  consumers  while delivering  benefits
that are only speculative.  A Heritage Rivers program that extends national land-use
planning has fallen into place.  Additionally, efforts  are increasing to impose urban
visions of zoning and planning on agricultural communities.
Read optimistically, the  combination of political actions  and resumption  of
state control reveals an evolutionary pattern that cannot be denied.  There is a quiet
property revolution occurring in the United States, a revolution in the original sense
133of the word-a return  to  an  original  position.  The  takings  clause  of the  Fifth
Amendment is slowly recovering its original meaning:  "Nor shall private property be
taken for public purposes  without just compensation."  But, the process  is  indeed
slow.
Some  Final  Thoughts
The  Fifth Amendment  of the  U.S.  Constitution  was  intended  to protect  all
citizens  from  an over-zealous  government.  Farmers,  ranchers,  retailers,  land
developers  and environmentalists stand protected by a fundamental rule of law that
forms  the basis  of their  freedom.  Even  at the  time of the  founding,  there was  a
controversy  about just  how  much  power  to  place  in  the  hands  of elected
representatives.  Some wanted the new government  to generate order from the top
down.  Others believed that power  should reside with ordinary people who  would
expect  government  to protect  rights that  had  emerged  over  a  long  and arduous
struggle.  There were two competing visions of the role of citizens in a free society.
The new government established a new order, which in the Great Seal of the
United  States, is called a "New Order under Heaven."  For the first time in history,
ordinary people were given almost unlimited rights to seek and maintain their fortunes.
The old order, control from the top down, was rejected.
In a free society where citizens hold the precious right to petition government,
the tug and pull for government to address private and public problems has continued
without limit.  As time has passed, the federal government has expanded its powers
at the behest of special interest  groups who  seek redress,  comfort and profit.  The
force of Constitutional constraints today is a far cry from that felt in the first century
after the nation's founding.  Government's  power to regulate has  expanded almost
without limit.
Farmers, ranchers and countless other citizens feeling the burden of government
now call for a return to first principles.  The restraint embodied in the takings clause
is again being felt.
The issues that galvanize the interests of farmers and ranchers are often crystal
clear.  Private  property  rights  have  simply been  redefined  as  public  property,
unaccompanied  by  compensation.  In  other  cases,  the  issues  are  clouded by  the
presence of regulations  that are substitutes for common law rules-regulations that
attempt to deal with private  and public nuisances.
If property rights are to be protected, there is a role to be played by an impartial
referee.  At times, private interests stand in the way of reaching goals that all citizens
would embrace.  But, while that may be government's role, there is no reason for the
goals of the many to be obtained at the expense of the few.  That unhappy outcome
can readily be avoided.
134When  government  seeks  to  serve  the  public,  whether  it be  by preserving
threatened  and  endangered  species,  securing  sensitive  habitat  or  altering  the
management of public  lands, government has the power and the means  to pay for
legitimate rights that are taken.  Recognition  of that duty yields  security to all who
seek  to  improve  life  in this  country,  whether  they  be  farmers,  ranchers,
environmentalists  or university professors.
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